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The term “Access to Justice” (AtJ) refers to the fundamental notion that all people – even 
disadvantaged groups of society – should enjoy effective legal/judicial protection, ultimately through 
the courts. Accordingly, the principal targets of the AtJ-movement’s criticism have been so called 
“Access Barriers”, i.e. different legal and/or practical obstacles that make it difficult, or even 
impossible, for the general public to turn to the courts in order to vindicate their rights. The most 
significant barrier is legal fees in general, and counsel fees in particular.  
 In a vast number of cases, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has concluded that 
law – substantive as well as procedural – is a rather complicated matter, which is often unintelligible 
to the layperson. Consequently, many self-represented litigants are neither accorded effective access 
to court (AtC), nor a fair trial – simply because they lack the skills necessary to present their case 
properly and competently. Therefore, the right to counsel has gradually evolved into a fundamental 
human right – not just in criminal cases, but also under the civil head of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 Before Swedish courts, the parties to a dispute are always free to hire an attorney to conduct 
their case. In this narrow sense, the “right to counsel” is unconditional under Swedish law – both 
before the general courts and the administrative courts. In practice, however, the right to be assisted 
by counsel is conditional, since hiring a lawyer is always associated with a cost. In this way, a right 
that is theoretically bestowed on all is de facto denied many by the realities of economics. Or as the 
saying goes: “Justice is open to all; like the Ritz Hotel.”  
 It is an undeniable fact that most litigants will not be able to obtain counsel, if counsel fees are 
not covered by a legal aid and/or legal protection insurance scheme, or at least reimbursed through 
cost shifting rules. Against this background, this thesis examines how counsel fees are handled 
before Swedish courts in relation to the imbricated notions of AtJ and AtC. More specifically, the 
thesis discusses (1) “party funding” (i.e. cost shifting), (2) “public funding” (i.e. legal aid) and (3) 
“third-party funding” (i.e. legal insurance), with a comparative perspective on the Swedish civil, 
criminal and administrative procedure. Since a right to counsel can be derived from Article 6 of the 
ECHR, Swedish law is also compared with the case law of the ECtHR. Lastly, the thesis criticises 
“simplification of procedure” as an unrealistic alternative to lawyer-conducted litigation, at least in 
court proceedings which are adversarial in structure.   
 The thesis argues that all people are not guaranteed equal AtJ in Sweden and that Swedish law – 
in some respects – is not even in compliance with the standards set by the ECtHR. With regard to 
the general courts, it is argued that the rules concerning assignment of public defence counsel are 
constructed in a way that infringes the suspect’s fair trial rights under Article 6. Before 
administrative courts, moreover, it is argued that the absence of legal aid (as well as legal insurances), 
combined with a default application of the American (“no-way” fee shifting) rule give rise to Access 
Barriers, since most individual parties (usually “one shot litigants”) are forced to proceed pro se in 
disputes against highly skilled adversaries, viz. state and municipal agencies (“repeat player 
litigants”). In view of this asymmetry, it is asserted that self-represented litigants are not always 
guaranteed effective access to a court/a fair trial. 
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